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Does Reputation Really Signal Potential Success in Online 
Marketplaces, or is it only a Trigger? 
 
 




The implicit assumption in online marketplaces is that reputation, registered as the average of previous 
ratings, represents a market opinion of the trustworthiness of a business party and that this predicts 
eventual satisfaction with the expected outcome of the transaction. Extensive research indeed shows that 
such reputation does result in a higher probability of the seller being chosen in both services and goods 
markets, presumably because buyers believe that higher rating sellers have a better probability of 
delivering. Whether reputation actually predicts successful completion of the project and payment, rather 
than bid choice, however, is an unknown. This study answers that question. The data show that only when 
the rating value is above 5.5, which is rounded up in the market presentation to a caption of “above 
average”, is there a significant relationship between previous rating of the seller and eventual payment.  
 
Keywords: Trust, Contracting, Service Auctions, software online markets, Buyer Feedback, Seller 
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1 ON THE IMPORTANCE OF TRUSTWORTHINESS INDICATORS IN 
ONLINE MARKETS  
The trust a buyer has in an individual seller in a marketplace, which in the case of online software markets 
means the coders who are paid to develop the software, is crucial in determining which bid is chosen 
(Gefen & Carmel, 2008). Trust is the willingness to depend upon the actions of another person in 
situations involving vulnerability and dependency (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995), which is 
precisely the case with software development (Gefen, 2002, 2004; Gefen, Wyss, & Lichtenstein, 2008). 
Trust is the assumption that the trusted party will not behave opportunistically by taking advantage of the 
situation (Gefen, Karahanna, & Straub, 2003), and will fulfill its commitments (Luhmann, 1979). Trust 
determines, in part, behavioral intentions to engage in an activity with the trusted party in situations 
characterized by there being an element of risk concerning the behavior of this trusted party. This has 
been widely shown in ecommerce and online product auctions (Choudhury & Karahanna, 2008; Gefen, et 
al., 2003; Kim, Ferrin, & Rao, 2009). People trust because they think the trusted party is trustworthy; 
Being trustworthy means this person showed integrity, ability, and benevolence (Mayer, et al., 1995).   
Applying this definition to online software markets, a trustworthy coder is one who the buyer believes is 
able to deliver, showing ability, and, when applicable, demonstrate appropriate caring about the buyer, 
showing benevolence, while keeping promises, showing integrity. Trusting this coder means the buyer is 
willing to take the risk of depending on the coder, i.e. giving this coder the tender (Gefen & Carmel, 
2008).  
To a large extent this perception of trustworthiness is based on past experience of both of the trusting 
person (Gefen, 2000; Luhmann, 1979) and of others (Dellarocas, 2003). Indeed, trust in online markets is 
often built based at least party through the previous ratings made by other buyers (Dellarocas, 2003), as 
also shown in the content of comments attached to these ratings (Pavlou & Dimoka, 2006). Ratings as a 
trustworthiness cue also command a premium (Ba & Pavlou, 2002; Pavlou & Dimoka, 2006) and are 
considered by some as an equivalent of word of mouth recommendation (Dellarocas, 2003).  
Research to date has not shown however whether ratings actually results in the transaction ultimately 
being paid, which is the real dependent variable of interest in services markets.  
Allowing that ratings represent market indicators of trustworthiness, an argument can be made why rating 
should behave as a trigger. Behaving as a trigger means that only ratings above a certain critical value 
should increase the identification of eventual payment, i.e. delivery of the acquired software service to the 
satisfaction of the buyer. The reason for this is that trust only comes into effect when the level of 
perceived risk can be overcome by trusting. When risk is too high relative to the level of trust, such as 
when ratings are low, trust should be immaterial (Mayer, et al., 1995). And so, presumably, among those 
low rating coders who are nonetheless chosen by the buyers, trust based on previous trustworthiness was 
not the primary reason they were chosen and should not, therefore, predict success the way trust usually 
does. Previous research on trust has not shown such a trigger effect.  
 
2 DATA COLLECTION 
The data came from RentACoder.com. This marketplace gave us a copy of their archival data for all 
transactions up to and including 2005.1 The data analyzed here contain all the tenders and all the bids 
made in 2005. Previous average and number of coder rating, previous average and number of buyer 
ratings, and the number of previous contracts between the buyer and the seller were all generated back to 
when the website began. In 2005 there were 320,790 bids made by 4544 sellers on 14,433 tenders posted 
                         
1 Gefen and Carmel (2008) used an older data set. 
by 5,874 coders. On average these seller made 3.18 bids (std. 4.97) bids and the buyers posted 2.46 
tenders (std.=3.80) in 2005. 11,794 of these tender, or 81.7%, were paid. There were between 1 and 274 
bids on each tender, mean 26.28 with std. 25.41. Ratings ranged from 1 low to 10 highest. The average 
bid amount was $149.31 (std. 405.15).  
 
3 DATA ANALYSIS 
Analysis of the data supports the trigger proposition and thus qualifies the implied assumption in the 
marketplace that ratings predict payment. Only tenders below $400 were included and only those with at least 2 
bids on them. Examining whether the average of seller ratings predict whether the tender is eventually 
paid, the data show that higher average seller ratings, but not buyer ratings, contribute strongly to 
identifying which projects will be paid and which not, but that the story is more complex. Only when 
seller rating average was in or above in the market defined “above average” category did seller average 
ratings contribute to identifying which projects will be paid. And, even then seller ratings contributed 
mainly to identifying which tenders were eventually paid, and contributed almost nothing to identifying 
which tenders were not eventually paid.  
Examining the comments associated with these seller ratings shows the predominance of keywords 
dealing with ability and dependability, indicating the importance of trustworthiness in this process, 
supporting the theory base used to predict this trigger effect.  
The data also indicate that the bidding characteristics controls included in the study, including higher 
priced tenders, bidding above the average of the tender, and more sellers bidding all contribute mainly to 
increase the identification of unpaid tenders but add up to only an R2 equivalent of 9%. Adding the count 
and average of seller rating next bounces the equivalent to over 21%, identifying mainly the paid tenders. 
The key finding of the trigger effect is shown in Figure 1. The figure shows the percent of paid tenders for 
each of the grouped values of previous seller ratings. The colors indicate marketplace categorization of 
rating numbers, shown in Figure 2. These numbers range from 1 to 10, with 6 being “above average”. As 
the figure suggests, and logistic regressions in Table 1 show, only when the ranking is above 5.5, which is 
rounded up in the market presentation to “above average”, is there a significant relationship between 




Figure 1. Percent of Paid Transactions by Seller Rating 
 
  
Figure 2. Seller Rating Values and Color Coding 
 
The data were analyzed with logistic regression. The dependent variable was whether a payment was 
made on this tender. The controls were entered in block 1 and seller ratings and the ln of their count in the 
second block. Sensitivity analysis was also done. Checking previous average seller rating at various 
values below 5.5, such as 5.4, 5.3, 5.2, and so on, produced the same pattern as when the average is set to 
below 5.5 in column 2. Likewise, setting the critical value of previous average seller rating above 5.5, 
such as 5.6, 5.7, sand 6.0, produced the same pattern as when the average is set to above 5.5 in column 3. 
The average seller ratings were examined in increments of .1 between 4 and 7. Table 1 shows these 
results together with analysis of all the data in column 1.  
4   CONTRIBUTION 
The study contributes to theory and practice by: (1) showing that rating is a trustworthiness indicator, and 
(2) that it behaves in a trigger manner, with only above average values contributing to identifying 
successful transactions, but (3) that even so it mainly identifies the paid, but much less so the more 
important category of unpaid transactions. (4) This important category of unpaid transactions is identified 
by the bidding characteristics. Moreover, (5) lowering bid prices through bidding may actually be 
counterproductive in that lower priced bids and bids below the market average are more likely to end up 
unpaid. (6) Additionally, the data show that count and average buyer ratings are an insignificant predictor 
of whether the transaction will be paid or not.  
 
  
Table 2. Results of Logistic Regression. Only Independent Variables included by the Stepwise 
Procedure are Shown.  
 
All the data 
Previous Seller Rating 
Average <=5.4 
Previous Seller 
Rating Average >5.5 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 
Sample Size  12030 327 11662 
of these unpaid 1863 227 1615 
Percent Paid 85% 31% 86% 
Block 1 Wald Stepwise 
# previous contracts 1.99 (p<.001) 1.83 (p<.001) 
ln Amount -.31 (p<.001) -.47 (p<.001) -.32 (p<.001) 
Amount Ratio to Average .62 (p<.001) .59 (p<.001) 
Days to completion -.01 (p<.001) -.004 (P<.001) 
How many coders bidding .03 (p<.001) .03 (p<.001) 
Average Buyer ratings 
Constant  2.19 (p<.001) 1.04 (p=.014) 2.41 (p<.001) 
Nagelkerke R2 0.092 0.137 0.089 
Correct Classification Unpaid 71.6 57.3 68 
Correct Classification Paid 54.3 64 59.1 
Correct Classification Total 57 59.3 60.3 
Block 2 Wald Stepwise 
# previous contracts 1.75 (p<.001) 1.70 (p<.001) 
ln Amount -.36 (p<.001) -.47 (p<.001) -.35 (p<.001) 
Amount Ratio to Average .42 (p<.001) .39 (p<.001) 
Days to completion -.00 (p<.001) -.004 (P<.001) 
How many coders bidding .02 (p<.001) .02 (p<.001) 
Average Buyer ratings not included 
Ln Number of previous coder ratings .24 (p<.001) -.55 (P=.005) .27 (p<.001) 
Average of previous coder ratings .41 (p<.001) .59 (p<.001) 
Constant  -1.61 (p<.001) 1.30 (p=.003) 3.42 (p<.001) 
Nagelkerke R2 0.211 0.172 0.161 
Correct Classification Unpaid 68.9 66.1 67.8 
Correct Classification Paid 70.8 60 69.3 
Correct Classification Total 70.5 64.2 69.1 
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